Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law
Volume 11

Issue 4

Article 1

2006

The Sixth Annual A.A. Sommer, Jr. Lecture on Corporate,
Securities & Financial Law
William Michael Treanor
Ben A. Indek
Jill E. Fisch
Edward F. Greene

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/jcfl
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, and the Business Organizations Law Commons

Recommended Citation
William Michael Treanor, Ben A. Indek, Jill E. Fisch, and Edward F. Greene, The Sixth Annual A.A. Sommer,
Jr. Lecture on Corporate, Securities & Financial Law, 11 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 698 (2006).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/jcfl/vol11/iss4/1

This Lecture is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law by an authorized editor
of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact
tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

LECTURE
THE SIXTH ANNUAL A.A. SOMMER, JR.
LECTURE ON
CORPORATE, SECURITIES AND FINANCIAL LAW t
WELCOME

William Michael Treanor'
Dean, Fordham University School ofLaw

OPENING REMARKS

Ben A. Indek2
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP
Jill E. Fisch3
Fordham University School of Law

FEATURED LECTURER

Edward F. Greene4
Citigroup Corporateand Investment Banking

t Edward Greene delivered this address at Fordham University School of Law on

November 17, 2005. It has been edited to remove minor cadences of speech that appear
awkward in writing and to provide sources and references to other explanatory material
in respect of certain statements by the speakers.
1. William Michael Treanor is the Dean of Fordham University School of Law.
2. Ben A. Indek is a partner in the securities litigation practice of Morgan, Lewis
& Bockius LLP.
3. Jill E. Fisch is the Alpin J. Cameron Professor of Law at Fordham University
School of Law and is the Director of the Fordham Center for Corporate, Securities and
Financial Law.
4. Edward F. Greene is currently the General Counsel of Citigroup Corporate and
Investment Banking.

697

698

FORDHAMJOURNAL OF CORPORATE &
FINANCIAL LA W

[Vol. XI

WELCOME

DEAN TREANOR: Good evening, and welcome. I am Bill
Treanor. I am the Dean of Fordham Law School. It is my pleasure to
welcome you to the Sixth Annual A.A. Sommer, Jr. Lecture on
Corporate Securities and Financial Law.
Fordham Law School, with the support of Morgan, Lewis &
Bockius, inaugurated the Sommer Lecture in the fall of 2000. The
lecture series began with the then Chair of the SEC, Arthur Levitt. Over
the past five years, the Sommer Lecture has brought to the Law School
the insights of Mary Shapiro, President of the NASD Regulation; SEC
Commissioner Harvey Goldschmid; William McDonough of the Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board; and the Chief Regulatory
Officer of the New York Stock Exchange, and also a member of our
Corporate Center's Board of Advisers, Richard Ketchum.
It has been in every case really a gem. We are so pleased at the
Law School to have the A.A. Sommer, Jr. Lecture because it's such a
tribute to A.A. Sommer, Jr. It is an absolute gem in our academic
calendar, and we are so grateful.
The Law School Center for Corporate, Securities and Financial
Law, which is directed by Professor Jill Fisch, with the assistance of
Professor Caroline Gentile,5 has grown along with this lecture series. I
would like to recognize Professor Fisch, Professor Gentile, and our
Corporate Center fellow, Beth Young,6 for all their work in putting
together this lecture. Thank you all.
I am now honored to introduce Ben Indek, a partner at Morgan,
Lewis. At Morgan, Lewis, Mr. Indek has worked closely with senior
counsel John Peloso. John is an alum and just one of the great friends
and supporters of Fordham Law School. Mr. Sommer recruited him to
Morgan, Lewis. John's remarkable commitment to the vision of the
Corporate Center is a large reason why the Corporate Center has started
and flourished, and it is a large part of the reason that we are here
tonight.
John has been instrumental in creating the lecture series, in creating
and growing the Corporate Center. All of us in Fordham Law School,
5. Caroline Gentile is an Associate Professor of Law at Fordham University
School of Law.
6. Beth Young is the former Fellow of the Fordham Center for Corporate,
Securities and Financial Law.
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all of us in the community, all in the University, are profoundly in his
debt. I would like to thank you, John, for all that you have done.
We are grateful also to Ben for being with us here tonight. It is
now my pleasure to turn matters over to you. Ben Indek.
OPENING REMARKS

MR. INDEK: Good evening, everybody. On behalf of Morgan,
Lewis & Bockius, welcome to the Sixth Annual A.A. Sommer Lecture.
This lecture was established by Morgan, Lewis to honor our partner
most identified with the securities industry. Al Sommer was a Morgan,
Lewis partner from 1979 to 1994, when he became counsel to the firm
and its clients. He was a skilled private practitioner for many years and
a prolific author and commentator on a wide variety of securities law
topics. Today, Al is probably best remembered by the securities bar for
his service as an SEC Commissioner from 1973 to 1976 and as
Chairman of the Public Oversight Board of the American Institute of
CPAs.
In preparing for tonight's lecture on international securities issues, I
noted perhaps a few little-known but relevant facts about Al's career.
Not only was Al an expert in U.S. securities law, but he also had wide
expertise and experience in international topics as well. For instance, I
found that Al acted as a consultant to several foreign countries on the
development of their securities laws and regulations, including the U.K.,
Jordan, Taiwan, and Egypt. He also consulted with the Asian
Development Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank with
respect to the securities laws of China, the Republic of Fiji, the
Bahamas, and my personal favorite, Trinidad and Tobago, where he was
actually the keynote speaker at that nation's securities training session in
1999.
It is clear that Al would have enjoyed hearing what our keynote
speaker has to say about the regulatory issues in the U.S. and Europe
tonight. Indeed, Al was with us for the first two lectures to introduce
our speakers, but, sadly, passed away in 2002 after a long illness. He is
represented here tonight by his wife, Starr, and his son-in-law Jeff. We
are honored that you have come to us tonight.
When Al joined our firm twenty-six years ago, he came to start a
securities regulatory practice. Today we have more than 100 lawyers in
the U.S. and in Europe dedicated to advising the securities industry in
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the broker-dealer, investment adviser, investment company, enforcement
defense, securities litigation, white-collar, public company accounting,
and corporate governance areas. We like to think that our practice is one
of the finest in the country.
We are proud of Al's affiliation with Morgan, Lewis and delighted
to sponsor this annual lecture in his honor.
That concludes my formal remarks, which have been vetted by
Dean Treanor, by Professor Fisch, and by one of my mentors, John
Peloso. Still, I would be remiss if I did not add one thought that would
not have gotten by John's editing pencil. John Peloso is a driving force
behind the Fordham Center for Corporate, Securities and Financial Law
and this lecture. He is also a pillar of Morgan, Lewis's securities
regulatory practice. At each of the previous five A.A. Sommer Lectures,
the responsibility of offering the welcome remarks on behalf of Morgan,
Lewis has been shouldered by John. This evening that high task fell to
me.
It is appropriate tonight that we honor not only Al Sommer, but also
John Peloso. Fordham and Morgan, Lewis owe him a large debt of
gratitude. We can begin repaying that debt now, in some small way, by
acknowledging John's vision and leadership and by saying to John,
thank you for your efforts, dedication, and friendship.
Professor Fisch?
PROF. FISCH: Good evening. I am Jill Fisch, and, as you heard
from Bill, I am the Director of the Fordham Center for Corporate,
Securities and Financial Law. On behalf of the Fordham Law School
community, I am delighted to welcome you to the Sixth Annual A.A.
Sommer, Jr. Lecture.
I would like to express - as well as everybody else has expressed
it - our school's deep gratitude to the firm of Morgan, Lewis &
Bockius, to John Peloso, for their generosity in establishing and
sponsoring the lecture and making this just a really wonderful tradition
here. We also have the honor of being joined tonight by the SEC
Historical Society, 7 of which our speaker, Ed Greene, is a trustee.
I also want to welcome and express my gratitude to Al Sommer's
family. I am really glad you are here.
As you know, the Sommer Lecture is part of the Fordham Program

7. For more information, visit the SEC Historical
http://www.sechistorical.org (last visited Apr. 19, 2006).

Society

webpage,
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in Corporate and Securities Law, a program that, with the formation of
the Corporate Center, has continued to grow in quality and importance.
We here at Fordham are able to take advantage of a distinguished
business-law faculty, including some amazing adjunct professors, a
remarkable alumni base, and, of course, our location at the heart of the
financial world. Our programs and events include public lectures,
policy-oriented roundtables, student-oriented lectures to introduce our
students to developments and career options in business law, and more.
The business law program at Fordham includes the Securities
Arbitration Clinic, in which our students represent small investors who
lose money investing in the stock market. It also includes the school's
specialized business law journal, the Fordham Journalof Corporate &
FinancialLaw. Many of you have noticed that the Fordham Journal of
Corporate & Financial Law was cited by the United States Supreme

Court last spring in its Arthur Andersen decision.
As with previous lectures, tonight's lecture will be published in the
journal, where, no doubt, the Supreme Court will read it in the future.
I, of course, want to thank Ed Greene for agreeing to deliver
tonight's lecture. It is a little-known fact that one of my first
assignments as a junior associate was working with Ed Greene, when he
was based in Cleary Gottlieb's Tokyo office. I, of course, was based in
New York. I think, for me, the biggest challenge of the assignment was
trying to figure out what time to call him. I hadn't adjusted, of course,
to the global practice of law, a subject on which Ed is an expert.
One of the challenges of the global practice of law, particularly in
the securities area, is regulatory conflicts. As our capital markets
become more global, we face continued questions about which country
and which entity is entitled to exercise regulatory authority over
transactions that are essentially international in scope. Moreover,
because different countries often have different underlying policy
objectives, their regulations often conflict.
Few people are more experienced and more expert in responding to
this challenge than Ed Greene. Mr. Greene is general counsel of
Citigroup's Global Corporate and Investment Bank, a position that he
assumed in the spring of 2004. For Citigroup, which as a financial firm
is subject to extensive regulation, the ability to deal with and resolve
regulatory conflicts is essential.
Prior to joining Citigroup, Mr. Greene was a partner at Cleary
Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton, which he joined in 1982. His practice there
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included the counseling and representation of corporate issuers,
investment banks, merchant banks, and commercial banks, primarily in
connection with mergers and acquisitions, securitization of assets,
distribution of securities, and enforcement proceedings before the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission. He has been resident in Cleary's
London, Washington, and Tokyo offices.
Prior to joining Cleary Gottlieb, Mr. Greene was general counsel of
the Securities and Exchange Commission from 1981 to 1982, and
director of the Division of Corporation Finance from 1979 to 1981.
Mr. Greene received his law degree from Harvard Law School in
1966 and an undergraduate degree from Amherst College.
He is a true scholar, as well as a distinguished practitioner. He has
published numerous articles in law reviews and other legal periodicals
on federal securities law, banking law, and mergers and acquisitions. He
is a co-author of U.S. Regulation of International Securities and
Derivatives Markets.8 Most recently, he co-authored The SarbanesOxley Act: Analysis andPractice.9
The list of programs, advisory boards, and committees on which he
has served is too long to recite, but among them, he was a member of the
Financial Markets Law Committee of the Bank of England, Chairman of
the Legal Advisory Board of the New York Stock Exchange, and a
member of the SEC's Advisory Committee on Capital Formation and
Regulatory Processes. Most recently, the Association of Securities and
Exchange Commission Alumni awarded Mr. Greene the William 0.
Douglas Award.
It gives me great pleasure to welcome Mr. Greene to Fordham and
to introduce him to you now.
FEATURED LECTURER

MR. GREENE: Thank you very much for those kind remarks.
I was delighted to accept this invitation, because Al Sommer was a
great mentor for me. I was the first outsider asked to head up the
Division of Corporation Finance from when it was founded in 1933. As
you can imagine, it was a somewhat contentious beginning. Al reached
8.

EDWARD F. GREENE ET AL., U.S. REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES

AND DERIVATIVES MARKETS (8th ed. 2005).
9.
EDWARD F GREENE ET AL., THE SARBANES-OXLEY
PRACTICE (2003) [hereinafter SOX: ANALYSIS AND PRACTICE].

ACT: ANALYSIS AND
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out to help me understand the history, the legacy, and the approach that
one took at the Commission. He also helped me a great deal in
connection with my first appearance at the San Diego Securities Law
Institute, where he was one of the founding members.
Starr, it is very nice to see you again. Al really was the lion of the
securities bar, and we miss him terribly.
I am delighted to see so many people here. I usually am asked to
give the international segment of the PLI Annual Institute here in New
York. It is always scheduled on Friday afternoon between 4:30 and
5:00. Usually we start at 4:40, and as I get to the podium, everyone
starts streaming out of the auditorium, because they really don't have
much interest.
International securities regulation is a narrow field for some. But as
General Counsel of the Corporate and Investment Bank of Citigroup, it
is an issue that I spend a great deal of time with. We provide products
and services throughout the globe, including in nineteen of the twentyfive member states of the European Union. Our multinational clients
want to offer securities in as large and liquid a market as possible, but
regulatory conflicts often frustrate this goal.
The E.U. has made substantial progress in implementing the
Financial Services Action Plan (which I will refer to hereafter as FSAP),
its broad legislative agenda to create an integrated European market to
be competitive with the U.S. market. This progress has given financial
intermediaries and issuers a significant interest in expanding
convergence in securities regulation between the E.U. and the U.S., with
my ultimate goal being reciprocity or mutual recognition, whichever
term you prefer.
The potential gains from convergence and market integration are
significant. The combined U.S.-E.U. market is large and growing. If we
put aside mutual-fund holdings, from 1995 to 2004, the total holdings of
U.S. equity securities by non-U.S. investors increased from $550 billion
to $2.1 trillion.'0 The total holdings of non-U.S. equity securities,
including ADRs, by U.S. investors increased from $790 billion to $2.5
trillion." If the U.S. and E.U. securities markets were fully integrated,

10. For more information, visit Federal Reserve, Flow of Funds Accounts of the
United States, Table L.213, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/zl/
Current/accessible/1213.htm (last visited May 10, 2006).
Id.
11.
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substantial expenditures, such as the cost of accounting reconciliations,
production of multiple prospectuses, and periodic disclosure documents,
would be reduced or eliminated, reducing the overall cost of raising
capital.
Moreover, it has been estimated that by combining the greater
automation found in European trading systems with the greater
efficiency of U.S. intermediaries, it may be possible to decrease the cost
of trading, in a fully unified transatlantic securities market, by 60
percent, which could decrease the overall cost of capital by up to 9
percent.12
From my perspective as a regulator, a lawyer, and now a general
is a fully
counsel, my ideal outcome - perhaps unrealistic integrated, seamless U.S. and E.U. market. In this scenario, when two
different national regulatory authorities have a claim to jurisdiction over
the same activity, they would not unnecessarily partition markets by
imposing different and mutually incompatible standards.
How close are we to achieving this goal of a fully integrated
market? Is it even realistic? Before I try to answer that question, some
background might be helpful.
As you know, in the United States, the model is national treatment.
All issuers, domestic or foreign, are treated the same. The SEC has
These
granted limited concessions to foreign private issuers.13
companies have an exemption from the proxy rules, the requirement to
file quarterly reports, Section 16 requirements, and the requirement to
disclose individual compensation of executive officers and directors.
Also, they can report in the U.S. using local GAAP financial statements.
But this concession is of limited value, because local GAAP financial
statements must be audited under U.S. auditing standards, reconciled to
U.S. GAAP, and the auditors must satisfy U.S. independence standards.
The general approach of the SEC remains the same today as it was
when cross-border trading was much less extensive. That is, to protect
U.S. investors, we need a uniform standard that should apply to any
involvement in the U.S. markets. Sarbanes-Oxley was a classic example
of national treatment, even though the SEC did eventually grant some
minor concessions to foreign private issuers, who vigorously protested

12. BENN STEIL, BUILDING A TRANSATLANTIC SECURITIES MARKET (2002),
availableat http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/steilisma.pdf.
13. See SOX: ANALYSIS AND PRACTICE, supra note 9, at 6.
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being made subject to the act.14
What is interesting is that the E.U. is now adopting a similar
approach. While the E.U. is integrating its international securities
market through FSAP, using the concept of the common passport, nonE.U. issuers will generally now be subject to the same rules as E.U.
companies.15
But there is a fundamental difference. The E.U. has, in some cases,
adopted the concept of equivalency, which is a finding by one regulator
that there has been a level of convergence such that another regulator's
standards and how they are enforced have the same practical effect as its
own. For example, the E.U. will now allow non-E.U. issuers to use their
own disclosure and accounting standards if the European Commission or
an individual member state determines that the issuer's home country
standards are equivalent to those mandated by the E.U. 16 Essentially,
this is "national treatment lite" for non-E.U. issuers. This flexibility is
key to the prospects of future transatlantic convergence, as I will
discuss. The United States should also focus on equivalence, seeking
substantial convergence and mutual recognition between home and host
country regulators, instead of harmonization.
The prospects for mutual determinations of equivalence vary in
different areas of securities regulation. I will touch on some relevant
considerations in the areas in which I think these findings can be made
quite soon: disclosure, accounting and auditing, regulation of public
offers, and secondary market transactions. Other areas - cross-border
access to exchanges and trading platforms, regulation of rating agencies,
and hedge funds - will take more time.

In the transatlantic securities markets today, we are closest to being
able to determine equivalence with respect to disclosure. Both the
European Union and the U.S. have adopted the disclosure standards
promulgated by the International Organization of Securities
Commissions, IOSCO, which set out ten core disclosure areas for

14. See id. at 60 (discussing concessions regarding audit committee requirements).
15. See Ethiopis Tafara, Testimony Concerning Global Markets, National
Regulation, and Cooperation, May 13, 2004, available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/testimony/ts051304et.htm.
16. See Letter from Adam Kinsley, Head of Regulatory Strategy, London Stock
Exchange, to M. F Demarigny, Secretary General, CESR, Oct. 17, 2003, available at
http://www.londonstockexchange.com/livecmsattach/2593.doc.
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prospectuses. 17 The SEC conformed the disclosure required in Form 20F, for prospectuses and annual reports used by foreign private issuers, to
the IOSCO standards in 1999. The requirements for annual reports for
U.S. companies, in Form 10-K, are virtually identical.
In Europe, the Prospectus Directive, a widely acclaimed part of the
Financial Services Action Plan, implements the IOSCO standards for
European prospectuses and initiates a common passport system for
public offerings throughout the European economic area.8 Only an
issuer's home-country member state will review its prospectus, the body
of which can be prepared - and this was a great source of tension for
the French - in any language "customary in the sphere of international
finance." Many of us don't think the French language qualifies, but
there is a different view, perhaps, in Paris.
The host state cannot add additional disclosure requirements above
those set forth in the Prospectus Directive and the related E.C. Rules,
although it can require that the summary portion of the prospectus be
translated. As an E.U. internal matter, then, European Union-wide retail
public offerings, problematic before the effective date of the Prospectus
Directive because of the need to translate the offering document into
many local languages, should now be possible.
When I participated in one of the privatizations of Deutsche
Telekom, there were prospectuses in fifteen different languages, in
fifteen different countries, and a contentious aspect of the underwriting
agreement was who would assume responsibility if the prospectus had
been mistranslated. That issue, I think, will drop away as we go
forward.
Given the progress that has been made through the Prospectus
Directive, it does not seem to me too optimistic to expect that issuers
will, in the not-too-distant future, be able to use prospectuses satisfying
the requirements of either the E.U. or the U.S. to satisfy the
requirements of the other market, which is similar to what has been the
case between the United States and Canada since 1991, under the multijurisdictional disclosure system.
17. See International Organization of Securities Commissions, International
Disclosure Standards for Cross-Border Offerings and Initial Listings by Foreign Issuers,
Sept. 1998, available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD81 .pdf.
18.
U.S.-E.U. Financial Markets Dialogue, 108th Cong. 6 (2004) (statement of
Kenneth W. Dam & Hal S. Scott, House Comm. on Fin. Serv.), available at
http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/061704hs.pdf (last visited Apr. 19, 2006).
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Also, noteworthy progress toward equivalence has been made in
accounting standards under U.S. GAAP and International Financial
Reporting Standards, which I will refer to hereafter by this wonderful
acronym, "IFRS." Equivalence is likely to be achieved first with respect
to accounting standards. However, equivalence in auditing standards,
auditor independence, and auditor qualification and registration
requirements is also key if IFRS are to be acceptable to the SEC in lieu
of reconciliation.
The extent to which U.S. and E.U. accounting standards were
approaching equivalence was indicated in a speech last April by Don
Nicolaisen, the former chief accountant of the SEC.1 9 He set out a
possible roadmap for the acceptance by the SEC of financial statements
prepared under IFRS without reconciliation to U.S. GAAP, by 2009 or
sooner. The E.U. has its eye on this roadmap and, to encourage
implementation, is starting to offer a quid pro quo. This is important,
because what is now happening is that bargaining is taking place to
achieve the goals that I hope we can achieve. The Committee of
European Securities Regulators - with this marvelous acronym,
"CESR" - was established as part of the Financial Services Action Plan
in 2001, and it is charged with making recommendations of equivalence
to the European Commission.2 ° It has found U.S. GAAP to be
equivalent to IFRS -

now listen to this -

subject to inclusion of

certain remedies (read "reconciliation"), which may or may not be less
onerous than the U.S. requirement to reconcile local GAAP to U.S.
GAAP. But the E.U. commissioner for internal markets, Charlie
McCreevy, has taken the position that perhaps remedies with respect to
U.S. GAAP would not be necessary, depending on how the roadmap
21
comes out.

This flexibility - the "national lite" treatment I mentioned earlier
has implications that many non-U.S. issuers, including U.S.

19.

See Don Nicolaisen, A Securities Regulator Looks at Convergence, 25 Nw. J.

INT'L L. & Bus. 661 (Apr. 2005).
20. See Concept Paper on how CESR intends to measure equivalence between
Third Country GAAP and IAS/IFRS, Oct. 21, 2004, available at http://www.cesreu.org/ (follow "Consultation" hyperlink; then scroll down to "22 Dec. 2004" and
follow the "Details" button hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 26, 2006).
21.

See Charlie McCreevy, IFRS-No Pain, No Gain?, Oct. 18, 2005, available at

http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/05/62 1&format=
HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (last visited Apr. 20, 2006).
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companies, have not yet fully appreciated. Currently there are no
proposed remedies for financial statements that are prepared on the basis
of accounting principles, other than those of Japan, Canada, and the
United States.
Moreover, equivalence would depend on the rules of the issuer's
home country, not the rules it follows in other countries, such as the
United States, where its securities may be listed. As a result, Asian,
Latin American, and other non-E.U. issuers may be able to meet the
requirements for either the E.U. or the U.S., without meeting the
requirements for both. For example, in the case of a Korean issuer that
prepares its financial statements under Korean GAAP and reconciles to
U.S. GAAP because it is registered in the U.S., the E.U. currently would
not accept Korean GAAP, even if reconciled to U.S. GAAP, as
equivalent to IFRS and would require financial statements prepared
under IFRS for a public offering or listing in the E.U. of that company's
securities. The result is a market partition, because, unless a thirdcompany issuer was willing to prepare three sets of financial statements,
it will have to choose between either the U.S. or the E.U. for its foreign
listing.
To me, it will be very interesting to see which market will be more
attractive to third-party countries and the extent to which the E.U. or the
U.S. will permit the development of alternative exchanges that would
not subject an issuer to the disclosure and accounting standards required
for listing on regulated E.U. or U.S. exchanges.
It is interesting, in our competitive world today, that both London
and Luxembourg are developing such exchanges, such that listing on
those exchanges would not subject an issuer to the requirement to report
periodically under IFRS.
For U.S. companies, unless remedies are dropped, many of these
remedies will be effective and equivalent to reconciliation, which will
discourage U.S. companies from listing or doing public offerings in the
E.U.
In the E.U., IFRS must be approved by the European Parliament.
Imagine saying that U.S. GAAP would have to be approved by the U.S.
Congress. That poses the risk of politicizing accounting standards, a
risk we have also seen in the United States with respect to the issue of
expensing options.
Thus, the main unknown in predicting convergence of accounting
standards is the European Parliament's response to controversial
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standards, such as IAS 39, the standard on the recognition and
management of financial instruments, which attempted, so far
unsuccessfully, to introduce certain hedge accounting principles in
Europe.22 Consequently, there is a schism between the standards
adopted by the International Accounting Standards Board and those
accepted by the E.U. at this point. The United States has only
recognized the IASB standard.
But despite the convergence of accounting standards, continuing
attention will be necessary to how equivalent accounting standards are
applied in practice. There is an interesting aspect to the approaches in
the E.U. and the U.S. While it is not absolutely free from doubt, the
implication of CESR's recommendation of the equivalence of U.S.
GAAP and IFRS seems to be that the appropriate E.U. regulator would
review the adequacy of the remedy disclosure, but not the actual
application of U.S. GAAP itself. E.U. regulators would rely on the SEC
for that. But the U.S. is not likely to follow suit. It will, I believe, retain
the right to review and comment on the appropriate application of IFRS,
unless and until Europe establishes a single securities regulator or
otherwise ensures unitary oversight.
Thus, there is a risk of a U.S. version of IFRS developing that may
differ from that accepted by the European Union regulators, even after
issues like IAS 39 have been resolved. To avoid this result, the E.U.
must develop effective mechanisms to make application and
interpretation of IFRS consistent and to assure that reporting under IFRS
is comparable to and subject to the same level of rigorous review as U.S.
GAAP. If that were to occur, the U.S. might change its position.
But one of the E.U.'s handicaps with respect to having the U.S. find
equivalence is its diffuse framework of legislative and administrative
authority, which makes it exceedingly difficult to achieve uniform
interpretation and application. Unlike the United States, which relies on
federal regulations that often preempt state law, the E.U. depends
generally on implementation and oversight by member states of
directives adopted by the European-wide bodies.
I will describe briefly some of the steps the E.U. has taken to
encourage uniform interpretation. However, even my highly truncated
account will illustrate why the SEC will be reluctant, at least initially, to
22. See European Commission Accounting Regulatory Committee, July 9, 2004,
availableat http://www.iasplus.com/europe/0407arc.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2006).
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defer to European regulation in this area.
The first step in the Financial Services Action Plan was the
acceptance of the four-level approach set out in the Lamfalussy Report,
otherwise referred to as the "Wise Men Report," intended to expedite the
adoption of measures to implement the Financial Services Action Plan
by standardizing interactions between the different E.U. legislative
bodies.2 ' There are four levels to this process.
Level 1 is broad-scoped framework legislation, enacted by joint
decision of the Parliament and the Council of the European Union.2 4
This legislation sets out broadly the terms of the Financial Services
Action Plan. 25 Legislation can take three forms: regulation, which has
the force of law throughout Europe when it is adopted; or one of two
kinds of directives which direct the member states to enact conforming
legislation:
* Maximum harmonization. These directives preclude a member
state from imposing regulations not contemplated by the directive, thus
ensuring intra-European harmonization.
* Minimum harmonization. These require states to enact minimum
regulations, but allow them to impose additional super-equivalent
requirements, a practice known as gold-plating, that raises the possibility
of decreased convergence.
In Level 2 in the process, the E.C., in consultation with the
European Securities Commission and with advice from CESR, issues
detailed legislation implementing the Level 1 broad legislation.26 This
level of streamlined decision making by the European Commission was
a significant innovation of the Lamfalussy process.
In Level 3, the member states cooperate in implementing the Level
1 and 2 measures, and interact with CESR in order to obtain uniform
rules.2 7
Level 4 of the process is enforcement of member states that do not

23. See Initial Report of the Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of
European Securities Markets (2000), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/
intemal-market/securities/docs/lamfaussy/wisemen/initia-report-wise-men-en.pdf
(last visited Apr. 2, 2006).
24. Id. at 24.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
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properly implement the legislation.28
That is complex and in stark contrast to what we have in the United
States. Despite this process, despite this flexibility, there is still some
inflexibility in the regime in Europe that may jeopardize the finding of
equivalence. Take a simple example. The annex to the Prospectus
Regulation, a Level 2 regulation adopted to implement the Prospectus
Directive, set out detailed requirements for historical financial
statements. CESR considered making Level 3 recommendations that
national authorities require supplemental information for entities that
have undergone corporate transactions that make their historical
financial statements unrepresentative. We would call that requiring proforma financial statements to recognize a merger, for example. But
because the Prospectus Directive is a maximum-harmonization measure,
it was not clear that the national authorities had the authority to
promulgate those requirements. Accordingly, this seemingly minor
change required legislative action in the form of an amendment by the
European Commission to the Prospectus Regulation.
But notwithstanding this convoluted process, the E.U. has taken
certain steps to try to find a way to achieve uniform application of IFRS.
In July 2002, the International Accounting Standards regulation
established an aggressive timetable for the adoption of IFRS by issuers
with securities listed on a regulated market in the E.U.. They must
prepare financial statements in accordance with IFRS for fiscal years
beginning on or after January 1, 2005.29
Last month, IOSCO
announced, by the end of 2006 it will establish a database containing the
decisions by E.U. regulators concerning the application of IFRS that will
be accessible to each regulator on a confidential basis.3 ° CESR has
announced its support for IOSCO's initiative and has also released two
standards on financial information to coordinate the uniform
development of IFRS standards in Europe. 3 But it is far from certain
that the uniformity which characterizes U.S. GAAP because of SEC
28. Id.
29. Council Regulation 1606/2002, 2002 O.J. (243) 1.
30. See Media Release, International Organization of Securities Commissions,
Regulators to Share Information on International Financial Reporting Standards (Oct. 4,
2005), available at http://www.iosco.org/news/pdf/IOSCONEWS92.pdf (last visited
Apr. 3, 2006).
31.
See Price Waterhouse Coopers, CESR Takes Up the Challenge on Enforcement
ofIFSR, WORLD WATCH I, at 3 (2004).
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oversight will develop.
Concerning auditor qualifications, auditor registration issues, and
the scope of the audit:
In October, the E.U. enhanced the uniformity. of its own rules and
moved toward convergence with the U.S. when the 8 th Company Law
Directive became effective.31 The object of this is to reinforce and
harmonize European auditing by setting out principles for public
supervision of audits in all member states, requiring external quality
assurance and clarifying duties of statutory auditors, and defining
principles with respect to auditor independence. The directive also
provides for the registration and oversight of non-E.U. audit firms that
audit financial statements of issuers with securities listed in Europe33 a direct response to what the PCAOB and Sarbanes-Oxley did with
respect to non-U.S. audit firms which audit financials filed in the U.S.
with the SEC. But the competent European authorities will be able to
waive the requirements applicable to a non-E.U. audit firm if they
determine that it is subject to equivalent requirements in its home
country and there is reciprocity.
The critical factor for success here will be the outcome of the
discussions that are currently underway between the E.U., the SEC, and
the PCAOB on mutual recognition - that is, whether each side will
recognize the other as imposing requirements on audit firms that are
equivalent to its own, and therefore abandon dual registration.
If we make progress in that area, think about the implications for
licensing of, for example, stock brokers, and financial institutions,
among others.
In sum, there is reason to hope that in the relatively near future,
issuers will be able to use the disclosure documents they prepared to
meet disclosure requirements in the U.S. and the E.U. to meet the
requirements in the reciprocal jurisdiction without reconciliation or
remedies, and that accounting firms will not be subject to multiple
regulators.
With respect to the regulation of offers to the public, there has been
a widening rather than a narrowing between the approach of the E.U.
32. See James S. Turley, Get Ready for the EU's 8th Directive, DIRECTORSHIP,
June 2004, available at http://www.ey.con/global/download.nsf/US/ Directorship_
June_2004_EuropeanUnionTurley/$file/DirectorshipTurleyJune2004.pdf (last visited
Apr. 2, 2006).
33. Id.
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and the U.S. To put it differently, the Prospectus Directive moved
toward a model in the E.U. which, for at least well-known seasoned
issuers, the U.S. has changed significantly in the securities offering
reforms that take place at the beginning of next month. The Prospectus
Directive requires regulatory approval for all public offerings and
implements only a very limited version of shelf registration, even for
large companies.34 In the United States, the SEC has determined that
well-known seasoned issuers should have instant market access, without
prior review or approval of the offering documents by the SEC. Rather,
the SEC will focus its attention on an issuer's regular communications to
the market, such as its annual and periodic reports.
The SEC was able to implement this system because, at the time
shelf registration was implemented in the late 1970s, it made the
disclosure in annual and quarterly reports equivalent to that contained in
a prospectus. But the Transparency Directive in Europe, unfortunately,
backed away from achieving that equivalence, which perhaps explains
why there remains the focus on distributions in Europe rather than
continuous reporting to the market.
The E.U. also adopted a sweeping overhaul of the rules governing
securities markets, trading systems, and investment firms, in the Markets
and Financial Instruments Directive, called affectionately by many of us
"MFID."
As I noted earlier, improvements in the efficiency of
secondary trading markets could significantly decrease the cost of
capital, and the MFID may, in fact, enhance competition between
different types of trading platforms - exchanges, multilateral trading
facilities, and investment firms - given that all equity trades will need
to be reported.35 As a member of the industry, however, I can't help but
observe that the MFID, which imposes extensive new obligations on our
firm, among others, including new transaction reporting and conflict-ofinterest requirements that will require significant new infrastructure, was
adopted without a cost/benefit analysis, a cost/benefit analysis being one

34.
single

See Pierre-Marie Boury & Raj Panasar, The Prospectus Directive: creating a
European
passport,
CROSS-BORDER,
2004-05,
available
at

http://crossborder.practicallaw.com/jsp/binaryContent.jsp?item=: 11061825&tab=3 (last
visited Apr. 2, 2006).
35. Financial Services Authority, Markets in Financial Instruments Directive,
available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/About/What/International/EU/fsap/mifid/
index.shtml (last visited Apr. 2, 2006).
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of the key contentious issues affecting regulators in the United States.3 6
In September, a very interesting report was issued. A group of
industry associations, with the support of the Corporation of London,
published a major study calling for regulatory convergence of the
transatlantic markets, focusing primarily on the institutional, or what we
sometimes call the wholesale, market in equities and equity
derivatives.37 The report, which I strongly recommend to you, and
which is available in the press section of the Futures Industry
Association Web site, among others, argues persuasively for:
* The formulation of a common set of customer definitions for the
purposes of classification, solicitation, and documentation;
- A common approach to core investor protection objectives, such
as "know your customer";
- The development of a common set of examination and registration
requirements;
0 A consensual regulatory approach to firms' outsourcing
arrangements;
- The simplification of regulation in other critical areas, such as the
obligation to deliver best execution, trade-allocation procedures, and the
distribution of research, among others.
The adoption of these proposals in the course of implementing the
MFID would be a positive step in developing an efficient, integrated
transatlantic wholesale market for equities.
With respect to market-manipulation issues, there seems to be not
only a commitment to national treatment in both markets, but also
extraterritorial application to conduct which affects financial instruments
in the home country. Certain parts of the Market Abuse Directive,38
affectionately called MAD by some of us, with respect to financial
36. The European Commission has subsequently indicated that impact assessments
will be included in new commission proposals regarding financial services. See
Commission White Paper FinancialServices Policy 2005-2010 (Dec. 2005), available
at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/intemalmarket/finances/docs/white-paper/
whitepaperen.pdf (last visited Apr. 19, 2006).
37. Futures Industry Association, EU and US Associations Call for Regulatory
Convergence in Transatlantic Capital Markets, FIA INDUSTRY PRESS CENTER, Sep. 7,
2005, availableat http://www.futuresindustry.org/presscen-2169.asp?pr=57 (last visited
Apr. 2, 2006).
38. For detailed history of the Market Abuse Directive, visit European Union
Online, available at http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/internalmarket/securities/abuse/
indexen.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2006).
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instruments traded on an E.U.-regulated exchange would regulate nonE.U. conduct, an approach similar to that taken in Regulation M adopted
by the SEC.39
The MAD also implements rules on insider trading and continuous
disclosure in Europe that are substantially different and more rigorous
than the regime in the United States. It defines "information" broadly,
to include information that relates directly or indirectly to a financial
instrument or issuer and that could affect price, and then makes it illegal
for anyone to trade if he or she knows or should have known that the
information is inside information - no need to show breach of fiduciary
duty, no need to show misappropriation. 40 Did you know it was nonpublic material information? If so, you can't use it.
In addition, think of a continuous-disclosure obligation. Any time
the market is a false market because you know of developments that
have not been disclosed, you are obligated to inform the market
continuously, as opposed to the U.S. approach, where you do it
periodically or when 8-K otherwise requires you to do so.
In the area of market-abuse regulation, national treatment will
continue and harmonization is unlikely, notwithstanding the
convergence.
But the challenge, in my mind, will be regulatory
cooperation when cross-border conduct violates the Market Abuse
Directive, as well as similar provisions under U.S. law. Here, the lack of
a single European regulator with full authority to administer these rules
is regrettable.
What compounds the problem is that the roles of regulators differ.
Some European regulators have no power to settle cases, a power that
the FSA in the U.K. and the SEC have and use extensively. Thus, for
example - and we went through this with a controversial trade in the
U.K. - if there is an allegation of impropriety relating to a security
listed in multiple jurisdictions in the U.S. and the E.U., each regulator
will look to apply the Market Abuse Directive and its implementing
legislation separately on its own behalf. But the French and German
regulators, for example, must bring a case before an independent
39.
In 1996, the SEC adopted Regulation M to replace Rules IOb-6, IOb-6A, 1Ob-7,
l Ob-8 and 1Ob-21 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
40.
Commission of the European Communities, Proposalfor a Directive of the
European Parliamentand of the Council on Insider Dealing and Market Manipulation
(Market Abuse), May 30, 2001, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
site/en/com/2001/com200l_028 len0l.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2006).
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tribunal. They have no power to settle. Thus, notwithstanding any
language included in the settlement with the regulator that does have the
power to settle, settlement in one jurisdiction with such an authority can
only compound the problem in those jurisdictions where the regulator
must decide whether to bring the matter before an independent tribunal.
While the E.U. is aware of these issues and considering possible
ways of addressing them, my preferred path would be a memorandum of
understanding between the SEC and the European Commission that
would provide that if there is a cross-border investigation involving the
U.S. and more than one European Union market, the SEC and the
European Commission would agree which European regulator would
take the lead and act with the SEC on behalf of all European regulators,
with fines being allocated pursuant to an agreed formula, similar to that
which was done in the investigation of Shell by the U.S. and the FSA
together. A similar system could be implemented within the E.U. itself
with respect to conduct occurring in more than one member state.
Convergence and mutual recognition in these areas are gaming
importance from the U.S. perspective. Formerly, European companies
were willing to subject themselves to the U.S. rules, but the game has
changed. European companies want to withdraw from the U.S. markets
and are reducing their listings. The European Union has made it clear to
the U.S. that findings of equivalence of U.S. standards are not a
foregone conclusion. In fact, Europe has forced the SEC to begin
bargaining, initially with respect to the issue of consolidated
supervision, which is imposed on all groups providing financial services
in Europe under the directive on financial conglomerates.4" That
directive led the SEC to adopt rules permitting holding companies of
U.S. broker-dealers to register with the SEC as consolidated supervised
entities, so that they will, in turn, be recognized by the E.U. as being
subject to regulation equivalent to that imposed on the European Union
financial holding companies. Goldman Sachs, Lehman, Bear Steams,
Morgan Stanley, all have gone through that process, to avoid having
multiple regulators.
The next substantial area of transatlantic negotiation is whether
U.S. GAAP by itself should be equivalent to IFRS, as Commissioner
McCreevy has indicated, or is equivalent only with remedies (read
"reconciliation") as CESR recommended. Adherence to the spirit of the
41.

Council Directive 2002/87, 2002 O.J. (L 035) 1.
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roadmap by both sides should result in the former, on the assumption
that soon IFRS will be accepted in the United States without
reconciliation.
Other issues, perhaps, will be:
- What rules should be followed with respect to stabilization, overallotments and the size of the naked short in cross-border offerings?
"How should hedge funds be regulated?
" What access should be permitted to trading platforms on a crossborder basis?
Now that the E.U. has made significant progress on the Financial
Services Action Plan, more attention should be paid to approaching
E.U.-U.S. convergence in a more programmatic fashion, rather than on a
case-by-case, issue-by-issue ad-hoc basis. Why not set an agenda with
certain goals, similar to the Financial Services Action Plan?
Here is my suggestion: First, let's initially focus on capital raising.
I suggest that companies of a certain size should be able to access either
the U.S. or the E.U. market using the disclosure and accounting
standards, as well as the prospectus format, mandated by their home
country. While they would be subject to the liability and market-abuse
regimes of the host country, they would not be subject to ongoing
requirements in the host country, such as Sarbanes-Oxley or periodic
reporting requirements, as a result of having made an offer.
Under my proposal, eligible U.S. companies would be WKSIs. As
you know, these are defined as companies that are required to file
reports under the 1934 act, are current in their reporting, and have for
the preceding twelve months been timely in filing these reports, are
eligible to use Forms S-3 or F-3, have $700 million in equity or $1
billion in debt outstanding, and are not otherwise ineligible.
In my proposal, eligible European Union companies would be
companies that have at least $1 billion of voting and non-voting equity,
held by non-affiliates, and that would otherwise be eligible to use Form
F-3 if they were to register the offering.
There can be no doubt that there is equivalence of disclosure, in
part driven by the market for these well-followed companies. Reliance
should be on the home regulator as to whether any review of the offer
document is necessary wherever the offering takes place. The E.U.
should accept the SEC's decision to examine only the periodic
disclosure of well-known seasoned issuers and not their offering
documents. Similarly, E.U. home regulators could review prospectuses
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of eligible E.U. companies or adopt the U.S. approach.
My proposal will also permit E.U. eligible issuers to de-register in
the United States, which many want to do, because they are subject to
host country ongoing requirements which, in some cases, are
inconsistent with the home country's.
I would start with a three-year trial, at the end of which one could
decide whether to expand or contract eligibility.
Liability for failure to meet disclosure standards will continue to be
determined by the host country. I see no way of changing that.
Unfortunately, there has been no convergence in this area. Absent
change, even under my proposal, E.U. companies may be reluctant to
finance broadly in the United States market because of litigation risk.
Witness the recent class-action lawsuit filed against the Republic of Italy
with respect to some of its offerings.
Second, I would suggest that the E.U. and the U.S. reach agreement
that the home country's rules on stabilization, exercise of the Greenshoe,
size of the underwriters' permitted naked short positions govern in
cross-border offerings. There is currently a conflict between the U.S.
and the E.U. in this matter.
Third, I would see if we could achieve common treatment of
wholesale equities and equity derivatives customers of market
intermediaries and other conduct of business issues addressed in the
September joint industry association report, with a view to having an
almost seamless wholesale market where regulation could be much,
much lighter because it is a predominantly institutional market.
Finally, I would create a coordination mechanism for enforcement.
While a spectrum of proposals have been put forth in Europe, I believe
that the mechanism should provide the maximum possible authority for
streamlined decision making, preferably through a single decision
making body.
This, to me, is a start. It is predicated on a more active dialogue
between the E.U. and the U.S. These goals are a long shot, but given the
potential gains, we should try.
With that, I would like to acknowledge the assistance of Brian
Yeager in preparing this presentation with me. I will now be happy to
take any questions.
QUESTION: Ed, you mentioned that consolidated supervision was
an issue. I actually was in the SEC's Division of Market Regulation a
while ago, and that was a big concern - the capital requirements for
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financial institutions in the U.S. versus those companies doing business
in Europe - there was always tension between the European regulators
and the U.S. regulators. In fact, there was tension between the banking
regulators and the securities regulators.
Did this consolidated supervision of the capital requirements solve
some of those problems, or do we still have some of that tension?
MR. GREENE: It did solve them. The interesting aspect of the
consolidated supervision rule proposal - the SEC needed to make it
attractive to the firms, such as Goldman Sachs, who really needed it,
because they don't have regulation at the holding company level, and
without this proposal, they would have been subject to a European
Union regulator. The SEC made it very attractive, because it gave
alternative capital treatment to those companies that filed as
consolidated supervised entities, so that they can use their own internal
evaluation methods and will save significant regulatory capital.42
That will also bring the capital computation closer to how bank
regulators do it, both in Europe and the U.S.
It is interesting that no universal bank, which doesn't have to do
this, because they are subject to the Fed - and the Fed is recognized by
the E.U. as a comparable regulator - has filed. But my guess is that we
will find some of the universal banks filing under this so they can get
better capital treatment with respect to the U.S. broker-dealer. That is
something that Citigroup is actively considering.
QUESTION: I am Professor Goebel, and my field is European
Union law.
I want to congratulate you on a really impressive and thorough
description of what has been going on under the implementation of the
Financial Services Action Plan.
I have a comment and an unrelated question.
The comment: You referred several times to a desire to have an
SEC-type European Union structure. I think that, for the first time, the
trial balloons on a Union-wide securities commission and a Union-wide
banking commission are going to receive serious debate. But one must
understand that that would mean that this independent agency, of
whatever sort, has to be composed of representatives from throughout

42. See Robert L. D. Kolby et al., SEC Open Meeting Agenda, Supervised
Investment Bank Holding Companies, Oct. 8, 2003, available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/openmeetings/agenda 100803.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2006).
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Europe. I wonder whether you will be happier with the situation if you
get a securities commission.
At the present time, the principal interlocutor, by reason of power,
is the U.K. Financial Services Authority, because of the London
market's preeminence in Europe. You cited specifically the example of
how they have the power to have settlements, whereas in France and
Germany you have to have court review. That theory of appellate court
review of administrative agencies is very strong on the Continent, and I
think one would suspect that any securities commission would not have
the power to do precisely what you think is very nice to do in the United
Kingdom.
So my comment and related question to that is, do you really want
such a securities commission? Wouldn't you be happier with the
situation now?
The other, totally unrelated question: I think you are absolutely
right that, particularly since Sarbanes-Oxley, many large European
companies have decided they do not want to raise capital in the United
States, and some would very much like to get out of our regime. You
suggested that it would be desirable if we had some mode of facilitating
that. Do you think there is any practical possibility of it? Quite apart
from the chauvinism of American regulators, the fear of popular outcry
by investors in the United States if their belief in their protection is
removed, by allowing these companies to get out - do you think there
is any real possibility?
MR. GREENE: I will answer the second and come back to the first,
because I have had a lot of experience in both.
With respect to the second, the SEC has realized that you can't have
a system which is like a briar patch: You can get in, but you can't get
out. It is inherently unfair to say that, as a result of listing or doing a
public offering, you can be stuck in the market, subject to new
legislation that is enacted, and no way to pull back, unless you achieve
the remote goal of having fewer than 300 resident U.S. holders in a
multinational corporation. In fact, I am confident that the SEC will put
out a proposal giving multiple tests that would permit withdrawal. 43 It
43.
The SEC has, in fact, recently proposed a new rule 12h-6 that would permit a
foreign private issuer to terminate its Exchange Act registration and reporting
obligations in less restrictive circumstances. Termination of a Foreign Private Issuer's
Registration of a Class of Securities Under Section 12(G) and Duty To File Reports
Under Section 15(D) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release
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will be predicated on percentage of capitalization held in the U.S.,
number of shareholders, and perhaps trading volume.
No other market makes it that difficult to withdraw if you decide
that you no longer have investor interest in that country.
With respect to the first, that is a challenge. It is clear that most of
the continental regulators have no love for the FSA. The FSA clearly
views itself as first among the European regulators. But I don't think it
is going to be possible to achieve uniformity within twenty-five
countries. Having been through a trade which took place in London, it
basically involved investigations in Portugal, Spain, France, Germany,
Italy, and the U.K. There was no mechanism to coordinate, no
mechanism to resolve it. Regulators refused to cooperate.
I don't think that is going to make for an efficient market,
notwithstanding what Europe says. How do we assure that home
countries will apply the same standards?
So it may be some combination of maintaining the local regulators,
but having some bodies that might, for example, oversee application of
accounting standards, some bodies that might oversee with respect to
disclosure, but leave local authorities to pursue investigations and
enforcement proceedings.
It is a debate that has to go on. But after the trade that I mentioned,
there were comments in the press suggesting, "Isn't it now time to have
one regulator that can coordinate going forward?"
There is a proposal by CESR that they would be permitted to
designate one European regulator to act for all. But the problem is that
many of these regulators don't have the power to settle.
This came up for me in a discussion I had with Michel Prada, who
is the head of AMF, the French securities regulator. He asked me and
several others whether AMF should have the power to settle, much like
the FSA does. He thought it should and proposed it, and it became
extremely controversial in France - one of the most controversial
proposals he made - because in France, the argument is, if you give
power to a regulator to settle, it will take marginal cases, put pressure on
defendants to settle, and in the course of those settlements, articulate
their view of the law, which may not be what courts would uphold. The
idea is that you need to go to an independent body - he didn't mention
No. 34,53020 (Dec. 23, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/3453020.pdf.
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the SEC, but he didn't have to - as opposed to going to a regulator,
where you have to argue your case before an independent tribunal.
That is something that is embedded, as you say, in the Continent,
whereas in the U.K. it is much more like the U.S.
So it is a battle and a debate going back and forth. Lamfalussy
recognized that, politically, he could not recommend a single European
regulator. That was a nonstarter. The U.K. would never accept that,
because it wouldn't be located in the U.K. It would probably be in
Brussels, maybe in Frankfurt, conceivably in Paris. That being the case,
it was not going to happen.
QUESTIONER: I would simply agree with you. I don't think it
will happen. But if it did happen, I am not sure you would be happy
with it, because that continental tradition of judicial supervision of
administrative acts is very strong, and the Court of Justice, in other
contexts, has said that it is part of the rule of law which has to be
protected. So it would be very unlikely, I think, for legislation to
achieve this by the Council and the Parliament, to have anything other
than a possibility of judicial review of some sort.
MR. GREENE: You could be right.
QUESTION: To what extent, if any, do the corporate scandals in
the E.U. and the United States impede the development of one country
accepting the standards or the offerings of another country and vice
versa? If this is a problem, what kinds of reforms are necessary in this
area?
MR. GREENE: I think it is interesting. The scandals have probably
driven convergence in accounting standards, which helps, especially
with respect to off-balance-sheet arrangements.
I think the real challenge is going to be that the E.U. is now twentyfive countries, and the issue is, do you rely entirely on the home country
to review the disclosures or should the host country be able to step in, to
review both application and disclosure?
I don't think the SEC will accept home country review in Europe
absent a single regulator, and therefore will insist that they see how the
disclosure standards are applied, even though they are the same between
the U.S. and Europe. That will, I think, continue to be the case for the
foreseeable future.
If you are right that we are not going to get a European central
regulator, I think we are going to have a situation where we will have
the same standards, but as a result of a much more rigorous SEC
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oversight, we will have U.S. versions of E.U. standards and E.U.
versions.
The interesting thing is that many of the regulators in Europe don't
review the application of accounting standards. In the E.U., it was just a
very small body that would review the application upon
recommendation of a third party, as opposed to having any filing made
with respect to an offering reviewed by a regulatory agency. That will
change, I think, going forward, and to the extent we have agencies like
the FSA reviewing, on an active basis, the application of IFRS, we
might have more deference. But until that happens, we will have
convergence because of the scandals, we will have better disclosure, but
we will have the U.S. insisting that it have the right to review the
disclosure of any one financing. That is why my proposal is limited to
these well-known companies, because the SEC has taken the view that
they have sufficient confidence in those companies that they will review
just the annual disclosures to the market.
The weakness in my proposal is that the SEC is not, probably,
prepared, in the short term, to rely upon review of periodic reporting by
the home country. They would insist that if you are going to raise
money in the U.S., they also see how the market is kept informed.
But the hope is that there will be continued dialogue, and if the
standards converge and we have strong regulators - the challenge here
also is that the SEC can't pick out and say Germany is better than France
or the U.K. is better than Hungary. If you could, that would be easy.
But since you can't really do that, you are going to have to make a
judgment about the E.U. as a whole, home country versus host. In that
regard, I think it is going to be a long time before the SEC will defer.
This came up in other areas. Can you really single out one country
and say, "Their standards are pretty good?" It happened, for example,
with Regulation M, where we said, "If you follow the U.K. rules with
respect to market intervention, you will be okay," but no other rules are
singled out. That is very rare for the SEC to do.
They are
uncomfortable saying, "We like the U.K., not the French or the
Germans."
Thank you all very much.
PROF. FISCH: Thank you. Please join us at the reception.
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